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News broke during the last week of September 2008 that the 
Department of Homeland Security has begun testing a new mind-reading 
device.1  According to the Department’s website, the Human Factors 
Directorate of Science and Technology has been working on Future 
Attribute Screening Technology (FAST).2  Homeland Security defines 
FAST as 
 
∗  Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Development and Professor of Law, Florida International 
College of Law.  With gratitude to Professor Jane Moriarty for her invitation to this symposium and 
with love to Ken, Adam, and Nathan. 
 1. Thomas Frank, Anxiety Detecting Machines Could Spot Terrorists, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 
2008; Allison Barrie, Homeland Security Detects Terrorist Threats by Reading Your Mind, Fox 
News.com, Sept. 23, 2008 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,426485,00.html.   
 2. Dept. of Homeland Security: Science and Technology Directorate Human Factors 
Behavioral Sciences Division.  http://www.dhs.gov/xres/programs/gc_1218480185439.shtm#9 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
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an initiative to develop innovative, non-invasive technologies to screen 
people at security checkpoints.  FAST is grounded in research on 
human behavior and psychophysiology, focusing on new advances in 
behavioral/human-centered screening techniques.  The aim is a 
prototypical mobile suite (FAST M2) that would be used to increase 
the accuracy and validity of identifying persons with malintent (the 
intent or desire to cause harm).3 
Although design specifics have not been made public, the MALINTENT 
prototype is a device that rapidly and remotely measures subjects’ body 
temperature, heart rate, and respiration.4  MALINTENT then compares 
these measurements with a matrix of physiological norms to generate 
conclusions about each subject’s future dangerousness.  MALINTENT’s 
designers and proponents believe that this  new technology will reliably 
distinguish perspiring perambulators and fearful flyers from true 
terrorists.5  These claims are difficult to assess because the results of the 
only publically disclosed tests of MALINTENT were subsequently 
classified.6 
 The creation of the MALINTENT prototype signals that we are fast 
approaching a future of increased reliance on technologically 
sophisticated devices that purport to reveal cognition and predict 
behavior.  These and other new “mind-reading” machines will have a 
profound impact on society and law.  Those worried about the risks of 
these new devices will likely find cold comfort in the assurances of 
Homeland Security Department project leader Bob Burns that fully-
operational MALINTENT-screened security checkpoints will “restore a 
sense of freedom” to America.7  
I learned about MALINTENT shortly after I had returned from the 
University of Akron School of Law symposium on Neuroscience, Law 
and Government.  On a lovely fall day in late September 2008, Professor 
Jane Moriarty assembled an impressive group of legal scholars, judges,  
and scientists and asked them to embark on a far-ranging discussion of 
the potential points of intersection between neuroscience and law (a field 
sometimes referred to in the popular press – although not once at this 
 
 3. Thomas Frank, Anxiety Detecting Machines Could Spot Terrorists, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 
2008; Allison Barrie, Homeland Security Detects Terrorist Threats by Reading Your Mind, Fox 
News.com, Sept. 23, 2008 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,426485,00.html. 
 4. Barrie, supra note 1.   
 5. Barrie, supra note 1 (“If you’re rushed or stressed, you may send out signals of anxiety, 
but FAST isn’t fooled.  It’s already good enough to tell the difference between a harried traveler and 
a terrorist.  Even if you sweat heavily by nature, FAST won’t mistake you for a baddie.”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Barrie, supra note 1. 
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symposium – as “neurolaw”).8  We did not know about the 
MALINTENT prototype when we met in Akron, but many of us focused 
on current and future efforts to measure and correlate peripheral nervous 
system responses with cognition.   
New technologies designed for “mind-reading” are our future.  
They will likely include both cost-effective remote MALINTENT-style 
dangerousness detectors (for use outside the courtroom) and new efforts 
to map the neural correlates of deception and social behavior (for use 
outside and inside the courtroom).  In the very near future, legal 
scholars, judges, and practitioners will need to decide when law and 
society can legitimately rely on cognitive neuroscience and other forms 
of “mind-reading” research.  Under the circumstances, I was delighted 
that Professor Moriarty invited me to join this discussion and  contribute 
this Article to the Akron Law Review. 
Although neuroscience and neuroimaging technologies are in a 
dynamic state of rapid improvement, I will begin with a few basics.  
Neuroscience is the study of the brain and nervous system.  The three 
neuroimaging technologies/modalities most frequently used to measure 
brain activity are: functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
electroencephalography (EEG), and positron emission tomography 
(PET).9  fMRI uses an MRI scanner to measure active brain blood flow, 
EEG uses electrodes attached to the scalp to measure electrical activity, 
and PET measures the absorption of small amounts of radioactive 
materials introduced into the subject’s body.  All three neuroimaging 
technologies were developed for medical diagnostic purposes and 
continue to be used for these purposes.10  For example, fMRI images are 
frequently used for neurosurgical planning, EEGs for the evaluation of 
 
 8. See The University of Akron: Neuroscience, Law and Government Symposium – Program 
Videos [hereinafter, Neuroscience Symposium], http://www.uakron.edu/law/neurosymposium.php 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2009).  
 9. An important distinction between fMRI and EEG is that fMRI provides a more precise 
image of the location of neural activity than EEG, but is an inferior measure of neural change 
because fMRI images are generally taken every two seconds and EEGs use a millisecond scale to 
measure electrical impulses.  See Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2006.  During his presentation, Dr. Daniel Langleben also described a recent series of Japanese PET 
scan studies.  See Neuroscience Symposium, http://www.uakron.edu/law/neuroscience/panel1.php.  
He noted that despite the superior quality of the images generated by PET scan, these studies would 
not be replicated by any U.S. researchers because PET scans involve a high level of radiation and 
some amount of pain (due to the placement of an intravenous line).  Id. 
 10. Eric Racine, et al., fMRI in the Public Eye, 6 NAT. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 159, 159 (2005) 
(describing how fMRI and PET have “evolved as key research approaches to studying both disease 
processes and the basic physiology of cognitive phenomena in contemporary neuroscience”).  
3
Moreno: The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
8-MORENO_COPYFORPRINTER.DOC 4/27/2009  12:43 PM 
720 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:717 
seizures, and PET scans to monitor the progress of cancer treatment.11  
The field of cognitive neuroscience barely existed ten years ago;12 but  
neuroscientists have become increasingly interested in exploring the 
possibility that these same neuroimaging technologies can accurately 
correlate brain activity with cognition.   
Even more recently, cognitive neuroscience, “neuroethics,” and 
even “neuropolitics” and “neuromarketing” have gone mainstream.13  
Neuroethics, a term commonly credited to the New York Times 
columnist William Safire,14 is generally used to describe the 
constellation of normative and social issues implicated by decisions on 
how society should use neuroscientific data.   
I am writing this Article at the tail end of a prolonged and fractious 
election cycle.  Thus, it is also worth nothing that the 2008 presidential 
election marked the birth of a new field of neuroethics that  might be 
called “neuropolitics.”  For example, just one week before the election, 
the New York Times published an op-ed by neuroscientists from 
Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania asserting that  
[r]ecent research in neuroscience and psychology . . . suggests that 
most undecided voters may be smarter than you think.  They’re not 
indifferent or unable to make clear comparisons between the 
candidates.  They may be more willing than others to take their time — 
or else just unaware that they have essentially already made a choice.15   
These authors make relatively modest claims.16  However, an earlier 
N.Y.U. neuropolitics study concluded that brain scans of subjects who 
identified themselves as “liberal” demonstrate more anterior cingulate 
 
 11. See Columbia University Medical Center: Program for Imaging and Cognitive Sciences, 
The Future Role of functional MRI in Medical Applications, http://www.fmri.org/fmri.htm 
(describing the potential uses of fMRI technology in neurosurgical planning); Lee, Sang-Ahm, et 
al., Intracranial EEG Seizure-Onset Patterns in Neocortical Epilepsy, 41(3) EPILEPSIA 297 (2000) 
(reporting the results of a study using EEGs to analyze the onset of epileptic seizures), available at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119003501/PDFSTART); Specter Says His 
Cancer has Returned, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2008, at A05 (routine PET scan revealed that 
Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter’s cancer had returned).  
 12. Edward Vul et al, Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, 
and Social Cognition, PERSPECTIVES ON PHYSIOLOGICAL SCIENCE (forthcoming May 2009) (noting 
that efforts to correlate social behavior to brain activity began approximately ten years ago).  
 13. Racine, supra note 10 at abstract (noting that the wide dissemination of cognitive 
neuroscience research has “not escaped the attention of the neuroscience and neuroethics 
communities, the media or the broader public”).  
 14. A September 28, 2008 search of the New York Times website reveals that the term 
“neuroethics” first appeared in a May 16, 2002 Safire column entitled The But-What-If Factor.  
William Safire, The But-What-if Factor, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002. 
 15. Sam Wang & Joshua Gold, Your Brain’s Secret Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008. 
 16. Id. 
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cortex activity than those who identified themselves as “conservative.” 
According to the N.Y.U. psychologists, enhanced brain activity among 
the liberal cohort correlates with a heightened sensitivity to the need for 
change.17  A third widely-read (and widely-criticized) neuropolitics 
study from U.C.L.A. reported that brain scans of subjects who were 
shown pictures of presidential candidates or the words “Democrat,” 
“Republican,” and “Independent” revealed neural activity that correlated 
with emotions that included disgust, anxiety, ambivalence, and 
empathy.18  With the election just days away and the holiday season fast 
approaching, this neuropolitics research was replaced in the mainstream 
media with  even more recent “neuromarketing” efforts to use EEGs to 
gauge shoppers’ purchasing preferences.19 
All of this neuroscience in the news suggests that if we want to 
predict or control future social and legal responses to cognitive 
neuroscience research, we must carefully consider two basic preexisting 
realities: (1) our shared assumptions about the validity of the medical 
field of neuroscience and the accuracy of diagnostic neuroimaging 
technologies; and (2) our increasingly frequent exposure (even within 
the mainstream media) to uncritical reports of cognitive neuroscience 
research that purports to correlate brain activity with cognition, 
deception, or social behavior.  In general, judges, jurors, and the general 
public will likely view neuroscience-based evidence as legitimate “hard” 
science because researchers rely on technologically sophisticated 
neuroimaging tools of demonstrated accuracy.  Thus, neuroscience 
research is less likely to face the inherent skepticism reserved (often 
appropriately) for the “soft” sciences, the forensic science, or other fields 
of inquiry developed solely or primarily for litigation purposes. 
More specifically, the advent of nascent fields such as 
“neuropolitics” and “neuromarketing,” reveal the growing public 
appetite for cognitive neuroscience research.  We like to know how we 
 
 17. Nikhil Swaminathan, Are We Predisposed to Political Beliefs?, SCI. AM., Sept. 10, 2007, 
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=are-we-predisposed-to-political-beliefs.  
 18. Marco Iacoboni et al., This is Your Brain on Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007.  
However, this study was severely criticized by others in the field, including neuropsychologist 
Martha Farah, whose response to the Iacoboni study included the following comments: 
So why do I doubt the conclusions reported in today’s Op Ed piece?  The problems I see 
have less to do with brain imaging per se than with the human tendency to make up “just 
so” stories and then believe them.  The scattered spots of activation in a brain image can 
be like tea leaves in the bottom of a cup – ambiguous and accommodating of a large 
number of possible interpretations. 
http://www.mindhacks.com/blog/2007/11/election_brain_scan_.html.   
 19. Tim Harford, Money on the Brain: What Can “Neuroeconomics” Teach Us About How 
We Shop?, Slate.com, Nov. 1, 2008, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2203159/.  
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think and the expanding number of neuro-fields, reveals an intense 
public interest in research that purports to use “brain scans” to explain 
psychological phenomena.20  
Thus, future social and legal responses to cognitive neuroscience 
will be shaped by both our familiarity and our desires.  Because these 
two preexisting conditions have received relatively little attention from 
legal scholars anxious to be the first to map a brave new world of 
accurately neuroimaged cognition, they will be the focus of this Article.   
I.  HOW SHOULD LAW PREPARE TO RESPOND TO COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE?  
A.  The Potential Influence of Cognitive Neuroscience on Law 
Neuroscience will certainly change law.  In fact, neuroscience 
research has the potential to influence a vast range of legal decisions.  To 
the extent that neuroscientists increasingly make claims that 
neuroimaging reveals cognition, even the most unimaginative 
prognosticator might predict: (1) the preliminary investigative use of 
neuroimages to enhance witness interviews and police interrogations 
(including but not limited to lie-detection), (2) jury selection based on 
neuroimages that appear to reveal jurors’ unconscious stereotypes or 
biases, and (3) arguments about intent or sentencing based on 
neuroimage-enhanced explanations of behavior and predictions of 
dangerousness.   
Professor Hank Greely has cautioned that generating (even 
accurate) predictions about the many ways that neuroscience might 
impact law is an inadequate conceptual construct.21  In addition to the 
obvious concern that neuroscience data be demonstrably valid, Professor 
Greely suggests that the legal system must also consider the potential 
consequences of grounding legal decisions in neuroscientific findings 
including questions of fairness (when neuroscience purports to predict 
 
 20. See David P. McCabe & Alan Castel, Seeing is Believing:  The Effect of Brain Images on 
Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349-351 (2008) (concluding that the 
inclusion of brain images enhanced the perceived credibility of cognitive neuroscience research), 
Deena Skolnick Weisberg, et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COG. 
NEUROSCIENCE 470 (2008) (concluding that reference to (even irrelevant) neuroscience information 
interferes with subjects’ ability to accurately gauge the quality of explanations of psychological 
explanation). 
 21. Henry T. Greely, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADVANCES IN NEUROSCIENCE:  LEGAL 
PROBLEMS, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES in NEUROETHICS:  DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, 
PRACTICE AND POLICY, 247-48 (Oxford University Press 2005) (describing the many relevant 
factors that the legal system must consider to respond to neuroscience data).  
6
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behavior) and efficacy (when we seek to impose barriers and limitations 
on the use of neuroscience both outside and inside the courts).22  These 
concerns are implicated by anticipated legal and extralegal reliance on 
current and future cognitive neuroscience research. 
B.  Neuroimages in Court 
Neuroscience evidence is often admitted in court.  In fact, MRIs are 
routinely admitted even when they are relevant to behavior.  For 
example, last summer in a criminal case that attracted national media 
attention, a Manhattan jury viewed MRI brain scans of local celebrity 
defendant Peter Braustein.23  Braustein, a well-known former journalist, 
was charged with the kidnapping, sexual abuse, and robbery of a former 
colleague.  The jury viewed Braustein’s MRI scans and heard defense 
arguments linking Braustein’s schizophrenia to his inability to control 
his violent impulses.24  This jury presumably considered the possibility 
that brain scans might provide reasonable doubt that Braustein had 
formulated the requisite intent to harm this victim.  However, they were 
not convinced and the defendant was convicted on all counts.25  The 
Braustein case, because it involved MRI evidence to explain the 
defendant’s actions, is representative of the type of behavior-related 
neuroscience evidence that is increasingly likely to be proffered and 
admitted in both criminal and civil trials. 
C.  Cognitive Neuroscience Evidence in Court 
Cognitive neuroscience has yet to enter U.S. courts. 26  However, in 
June 2008, in a courtroom in Pune, India, evidence derived from a Brain 
Electrical Oscillations Signature (“BEOS”) test was admitted during the 
murder trial of Aditi Sharma.27  During pre-trial police interrogation of 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. David B. Caruso, Experts Study Neuroscience Use in Courts, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2008. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. However, in September the International Herald Tribune reported on a June 2008 murder 
trial in Maharashtra, India where the court found that evidence of the defendant’s brain scan offered 
by the prosecutor demonstrated that she had “experiential knowledge” available only to the killer.  
See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Use of Brain Scans in Courts Dismays Critics, THE INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Sept. 15, 2008.  See also Neuroethics and Law Blog: Brain Based Lie Detector Leads to 
Murder Conviction in India (Lawrence Farwell’s Response), http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_ 
law_blog/2008/09/brain-based-lie.html#comments (providing a brief description of the differences 
between the Brain Electrical Oscillations Signature test admitted in the Indian court and the EEG-
based “brain fingerprinting” technique developed by Lawrence Farwell).  
 27. See Giridharadas, supra note 26. 
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the defendant (who was suspected of poisoning her former fiancé), 
thirty-two electrodes had been placed on her head while police read her 
their account of the murder.28  Despite the fact that the defendant made 
no verbal responses during the BEOS test, and without reference to any 
specific evidence of the test’s scientific validity, the judge concluded 
that the BEOS test results proved that she had “experiential knowledge” 
of the crime.29   
There are currently two fully operational for-profit fMRI lie 
detection businesses performing brain scans in Massachusetts30 and 
California.31  Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that 
U.S. courts will soon confront similar efforts to introduce cognitive 
neuroscience evidence.  In the near future, when cognitive neuroscience 
evidence is proffered in court, it will be subjected to pre-trial judicial 
validity screening (like all other expert evidence) under the relevant state 
or federal evidentiary rules and standards. 
1.  Threshold Validity Determinations 
Ideally, threshold questions of scientific validity are addressed first 
by the scientists and then by the courts.  In the federal courts, and the 
more than thirty states that have adopted Daubert32 in whole or in part,33 
future admissibility decisions must be based on the scientific validity of 
proffered cognitive neuroscience evidence.34  In theory, these judges will 
operate the tools of science to make these pretrial admissibility 
determinations.  These should include the four flexible factors for 
assessing scientific validity identified by the Daubert Court: (1) 
testability/falsifiability, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rate, 
and (4) general acceptance within the relevant field.35  However, 
empirical research and common sense indicate that (in practice) judges 
generally avoid independent assessments of testability/falsifiability or 
 
 28. Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Court is Debated, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2008. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Cephos Corp: Arranging for fMRI Testing, www.cephoscorp.com/fmri-schedule.htm.  
During the symposium we learned from Dr. Steven J. Laken (President and CEO of Cephos Corp.) 
that Cephos currently performs fMRI lie-detection services and charges $4000 per test. 
 31. See No Lie MRI home page, http://www.noliemri.com/centers/Centers.htm (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2009).  
 32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
 33. See Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other 
Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (providing a list of states that have adopted 
Daubert). 
 34. Daubert,  509 U.S. at 592-93. 
 35. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (1993). 
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error rates and rely instead on the validity assessments from within the 
field often embodied in evidence of general acceptance and peer 
reviewed publications.36  Unfortunately, at least for the foreseeable 
future, judges forced to assess the validity of neuroimages that purport to 
reveal cognition, deception, or social behavior will find that the science 
of cognitive neuroscience is far from clear.   
Courts will soon discover profound disagreement within the 
relevant cognitive neuroscience community on issues great and small.  
For example, it  was not surprising to learn that symposium participants 
and fMRI-based lie detection researchers Steven J. Laken (President and 
CEO of Cephos Corp.) and Dr. Daniel Langleben (Department of 
Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania Medical School) dispute the 
accuracy of particular  neuroimaging studies or that they disagree about 
the specific question of whether valid cognitive neuroscience research 
requires a 3.0 Telsa MRI machine (an MRI machine of greater magnetic 
force).  However, it was startling (if commendably honest) to hear Dr. 
Langleben, whom many consider the progenitor of fMRI-based lie-
detection, express significant reservations about two foundational 
cognitive neuroscience assumptions: (1) that truth telling never causes 
more response in the brain than lying, and (2) that neuroscientists can 
accurately distinguish the brain activity correlates of salience from the 
brain activity correlates of deception.   
Dr. Langleben’s concerns are consistent with questions raised 
within the field of neuroscience by self-designated “neurorealists.”37  
Professor Moriarty gamely attempted to address some of these concerns 
(from the legal perspective) by providing future courts with practical 
advice on operating the relevant admissibility standards.  However, her 
work also highlights the fact that judges will soon confront the difficult 
 
 36. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers:  A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 445-448 (2001) 
(noting that a survey of 400 state court judges revealed profound difficulties understanding and 
applying two of the four flexible Daubert factors – falsifiability and error rates – which leads courts 
to emphasize the remaining two criteria – general acceptance and peer-review/publication). 
 37. “Neurorealism” is a term frequently credited to bioethicist Éric Racine of the Institut de 
Recherches Cliniques de Montréal in Canada.  According to Racine,  
Our concept of ‘neuro-realism’ describes how coverage of fMRI investigations can make 
a phenomenon uncritically real, objective or effective in the eyes of the public.  This 
occurs most notably when qualifications about results are not brought to the reader’s 
attention.  For example, commenting on an fMRI study of fear, one article states, ‘Now 
scientists say the feeling is not only real, but they can show what happens in the brain to 
cause it.’ 
Racine, supra note 10 at 160. 
9
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task of assessing scientific validity in this new, complex, and deeply 
divided scientific field.  
2.  Anticipating the Impact of Judicial Familiarity with 
Neuroscience and Neuroimaging Technologies 
 Judges who will control the admissibility and use of cognitive 
neuroscience evidence will be hampered by their general lack of 
scientific training and experience.  Recent efforts to train judges in basic 
science, such as Brooklyn Law School’s Science for Judges,38 may 
eventually improve judicial decision-making by expanding judges’ basic 
scientific knowledge.  In the interim, conscientious judges will endeavor 
to make accurate and consistent decisions based on ambiguous and 
unsettled scientific information.  These decisions should (but probably 
will not) include some recognition of the possibility that, as Alexander 
Pope once warned, “a little learning is a dangerous thing.”39 
Many judges will be intimately familiar with MRI scanners and 
will likely have based significant personal or family medical treatment 
decisions on neuroimaging test results.  This experience will inevitably 
shape judicial attitudes and preconceptions.  The risk is that real judicial 
decisions (like all other decisions) are based on a variety of powerful but 
unacknowledged influences.  For example, Malcolm Gladwell has 
postulated that many of our decisions are based on a process of rapid 
cognition that he describes as “thinking without thinking.”40  Although 
he does not specifically address legal decision-making, there is common 
ground between Gladwell’s popular work and research efforts by 
behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists who endeavor to 
explain  how  cognitive biases and heuristics influence judicial decision-
making.41 
A comprehensive discussion of the impact of rapid cognition, 
biases, or heuristics on decision making is far beyond the scope of this 
Article.  However, if we start with Professor Cass Sunstein’s definition 
of heuristics as “the basic claim is that in answering hard factual 
questions, those who lack accurate information use simple rules of 
 
 38. Margaret A. Berger, Science for Judges, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2003). 
 39. Alexander Pope, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM (1709). 
 40. See Malcolm Gladwell, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (Little, 
Brown and Company 2005).  Blink is “concerned with . . . the content and origins of those 
instantaneous impressions and conclusions that spontaneously arise whenever [people] . . . confront 
a complex situation or have to make a decision under conditions of stress.”  Id. at 16. 
 41. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 70 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000) (describing the impact of cognitive biases and heuristics on 
decisions by judges and juries). 
10
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thumb,”42 it is easy to envision judges relying  on such rules of thumb as 
the “availability heuristic” (which explains our tendency to replace more 
difficult and more accurate probability assessments with examples that 
more readily spring to mind) or the “representativeness heuristic” (which 
explains why we tend to make both warranted and unwarranted 
assumptions of commonality).  In this context, judges who 
unconsciously rely on mental shortcuts (as we all do) are likely to  
overestimate the validity of neuroimages that purport to reveal cognition.  
This is because judges will  mistakenly equate proffered brain scans with 
more familiar radiographic images or mistakenly assume that 
technologies that are demonstrably valid medical diagnostic tools yield 
equally valid conclusions when they are used to map the neural 
correlates of cognition.. 
Cognitive neuroscience evidence will create especially complicated 
problems for future courts, because this research involves new 
applications of well-established technologies.  These specific problems 
have been described by bioethicist Eric Racine, who frequently 
expresses his concern about the “uncritical way in which an fMRI 
investigation can be taken as validation or invalidation of our ordinary 
view of the world . . . [and] the belief that fMRI enables us to capture a 
‘visual proof’ of brain activity, despite the enormous complexities of 
data acquisition and image processing.”43  Similar validity concerns have 
been raised by other neurorealists, like Dr. Russell Poldrack of 
U.C.L.A., who warns that  
[a]s cognitive neuroscientists who use the same brain imaging 
technology, we know that it is not possible to definitively determine 
whether a person is anxious or feeling connected simply by looking at 
activity in a particular brain region.  This is so because brain regions 
are typically engaged by many mental states . . . .44 
In addition to raising general questions about the validity of many 
cognitive neuroscience-based conclusions, Dr. Poldrack also addresses 
the more specific problem of reversed causal inferences, which occurs  
where people see some activity in a brain area and then conclude that 
this part of the brain is where X happens.  We can show that if I put 
you into a state of fear, your amygdala lights up, but that doesn’t mean 
 
 42. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1560 
(2004). 
 43. See Racine, supra note 10. 
 44. Michael Shermer, The Brain is Not Modular: What fMRI Really Tells Us: Metaphors, 
Modules and Brain Scan Pseudoscience, SCI. AM., May 13, 2008, http://www.sciam.com/article. 
cfm?id=a-new-phrenology. 
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that every time your amygdala lights up you are experiencing fear.  
Every brain area lights up under lots of different states.  We just don’t 
have the data to tell us how selectively active an area is.45   
Another specific problem may be the quality of cognitive neuroscience 
data analysis.  A very recent article entitled Puzzlingly High 
Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social 
Cognition involved a meta-analysis of the empirical findings reported in 
fifty-two social neuroscience articles that relied upon fMRI studies.46  
Social neuroscience is a sub-field of cognitive neuroscience that seeks to 
correlate brain activity and social behavior.  Dr. Vul and his research 
team explored the analytic methods described in the fifty-two published 
studies and found that more than half suffered from significant problems 
of distorted data and biased correlation analysis.47  This led Dr. Vul to 
“conclude that a disturbingly large, and quite prominent, segment of 
social neuroscience research is using seriously defective research 
methods and producing a profusion of numbers that should not be 
believed.”48  As these few examples reveal, cognitive neuroscience is an 
unsettled and controversial new field marked by significant concerns 
about the validity of even peer-reviewed and published research.  Judges 
will need to understand the nature and extent of these debates to ensure 
that they do not oversimplify and overvalue conclusions that appear to 
be supported by brain imaging studies.  
3.  The Valid and Reasonable Application Requirement  
To be admitted in court, scientific evidence must not only rest on 
generally valid principles and methods, but these principles and methods 
must have been validly and reasonably applied to the specific facts at 
issue.  This requirement was added to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 
December 200049 after Justice Breyer emphasized its importance in 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.50  Writing for the Kumho majority, 
Justice Breyer noted that, based on the relevant facts in that case,  
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Vul et al., supra note 12, at 13 (“Thus, in half of the studies we surveyed, the reported 
correlation coefficients mean almost nothing, because they are systematically inflated by the biased 
analysis.”)  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (permitting expert testimony when “(1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) 
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case”).   
 50. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137 (1999). 
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[t]he specific issue before the [district] court was not the 
reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual and tactile 
inspection, [but was instead] the reasonableness of using such an 
approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to 
which the expert testimony was directly relevant.51   
A more colorful and equally persuasive example is Justice 
Blackmun’s Daubert werewolf.52  Writing for the Daubert majority, 
Justice Blackmun explained that valid moon phase studies should be 
admitted to reveal lighting conditions; but that these same studies should 
be excluded if they have been proffered to explain the criminal 
defendant’s bizarre behavior.53  Thus, in the cognitive neuroscience 
context, research designed to reveal deception that is based on the brain 
activity of subjects who have been instructed to lie about insignificant 
events under highly artificial conditions should be excluded unless and 
until there is adequate empirical evidence demonstrating that this 
research can reasonably and reliably be applied to the case.  
Cognitive neuroscience, like all nascent scientific fields will raise 
new and interesting science and law questions.  Judges who overestimate 
the validity of this evidence because they equate it with diagnostic 
medical imaging or mistakenly assume valid application to the facts at 
issue invite jurors to rely on cognitive neuroscience evidence that is, as 
Don Pardo might say, “not ready for prime time.”54  At the individual 
case level, jury reliance on evidence of dubious validity will lead to 
inconsistent and illegitimate verdicts.  The systemic concerns raised by 
legal reliance on this type of evidence are more profound.  If cognitive 
neuroscience enters our civil and criminal courts prematurely, a legal 
imprimatur of validity will inevitably spill over to other cases and to the 
world outside the courthouse. 
 
 51. Id. at 153-54. 
 52. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). 
 53. Id. (“The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid scientific 
‘knowledge’ about whether a certain night was dark, and if darkness is a fact in issue, the 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact.  However (absent creditable grounds supporting such a link), 
evidence that the moon was full on a certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining 
whether an individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that night.”).  In earlier 
work, I have posited that Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137, was designed to encourage future courts to 
focus more careful attention on the relevance/application question rather than to simply assume that 
the general validity of an expert’s field or opinion necessarily implies that the evidence fits the case 
at hand.  See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the 
Oceans that Divide Science and Law With Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1049-
1055 (2001). 
 54. Don Pardo is the long time announcer for Saturday Night Live. 
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4.  The Potential Effects of Legal Reliance on Cognitive 
Neuroscience Evidence  
Law does not occur in a vacuum.  Legal decisions involving 
science implicate the legitimacy of both law and science.  In fact, as 
Justice Breyer has observed, “[t]he importance of scientific accuracy in 
the decision of [science-based] cases reaches well beyond the case 
itself”55 because 
[a] decision wrongly denying compensation in a toxic substance case . 
. . can deprive not only the plaintiff of warranted compensation but can 
discourage other similarly situated individuals from even trying to 
obtain compensation and can encourage the continued use of a 
dangerous substance.  On the other hand, a decision wrongly granting 
compensation, although of immediate benefit to the plaintiff, through 
the strong financial disincentives that accompany a finding of tort 
liability, can improperly force abandonment of the substance.  Thus if 
the decision is wrong, it will improperly deprive the public of what can 
be far more important benefits -- those surrounding a drug that cures 
many while subjecting a few to less serious risk, for example.56 
Because, according to Justice Breyer, individual science-based legal 
decisions redound to law, science, and society, “[t]he upshot is that we 
must search for law that reflects an understanding of the relevant 
underlying science.”57  Justice Breyer’s fear that bad legal thinking 
about science can yield not only bad law, but bad science has been 
realized in controversies that range from the silicone breast implant 
litigation of the early 1990s58 to some very recent decisions authorizing 
damages for autism-related injuries following plaintiffs’ MMR 
vaccines.59  When judges legitimize pseudoscientific ideas by accepting 
them into their courtrooms, the repercussions of these decisions 
transcend the individual cases.  As we know from our experience with 
 
 55. Associate Justice Stephen J. Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 
SCIENCE 537, 537 (Apr. 24, 1998). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. For a detailed analysis of the impact of judicial pseudoscience on legitimate science, 
regulatory actions, and social expectations in the breast implant context see Marcia Angell, SCIENCE 
ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1996).  
 59. See Arthur Allen, Treating Autism as if Vaccines Caused it, Slate 4/1/09 (describing how 
parents who mistakenly believe that autism is caused by thimerisol (a now-discontinued MMR 
vaccine preservative) subject their children to dangerous and ineffective chelation therapy).   
See generally Joëlle Anne Moreno, Toxic Torts, Autism, and Bad Science:  Why the Courts May Be 
Our Best Defense Against Scientific Relativism, 40 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 409 (2006). 
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the forensic sciences, misunderstandings about scientific validity are 
compounded when judges mistake repeated admission at trial (general 
acceptance in the courts) for general acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community. 
Within the field, profound validity concerns currently divide 
cognitive neuroscientists.  Outside the field, premature social and legal 
legitimatization of this type of evidence increase the risk that our borders 
will be patrolled by MALINTENT–style mind-reading machines and our 
courtrooms equipped with light boxes so that jurors can consider 
radiologic images when assessing credibility or behavior.  Under the 
circumstances, it was surprising that so many symposium participants 
merely mentioned and then breezed past these concerns.  Their goal was 
apparent.  Most of the commentators were so anxious to explore the 
uncharted philosophical, bioethical, jury nullification, substantive 
criminal law, and constitutional implications of future mind-reading 
technologies that they simply assumed away threshold accuracy 
concerns.60   
One notable exception was Professor Michael Perlin, who clearly 
prefers the “Slow Train”61 to cognitive neuroscience evidence.  
Professor Perlin focused his analysis on the potential in-court use of 
brain images to support insanity defense arguments.  He expressed 
significant skepticism about the potential validity of new mind-reading 
technologies especially when balanced against the powerful visceral jury 
appeal of colorful pictures that appear to reduce the complexity of 
psychological phenomena.  Given the fact that American juries are 
increasingly exposed to physiological explanations for aberrant 
behavior, radiologic images (as a component of even routine healthcare), 
and cognitive neuroscience information in the mainstream media, 
Professor Perlin’s concerns are prescient.   Although there is no easy fix, 
Professor Perlin suggested that courts should endeavor to resolve 
important threshold validity problems (e.g., the effect of various anti-
psychotic medications routinely given to criminal defendants on brain 
 
 60. In addition to the symposium presenters, this list should include scholars like Professor 
Michael Pardo, who (in other fora) has addressed the question of whether accurate neuroscience-
enhanced interrogation and lie detection will force a reconceptualization of various fundamental 
constitutional rights and privileges.  See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Evidence, Legal Culture, and 
Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006) (exploring the possible impact of 
neuroscientific evidence on the Fourth Amendment, the Self Incrimination Clause, and Due Process 
rights).  
 61. This is a friendly reference to Professor Perlin’s well-known abiding interest in the words 
and music of Bob Dylan.  See Nick Paumgarten, Another Side of Bob Dylan, THE NEW YORKER, 
Nov. 18, 2002, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/11/18/021118 
ta_talk_paumgarten. 
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functioning) and threshold legal problems (e.g., defendant consent and 
access to public funds for the neuroimaging of indigent defendants) 
before they begin to allow cognitive neuroscience evidence to alter the 
insanity playing field.  
C.  Extra-Legal Uses of Cognitive Neuroscience 
The symposium also presented a balance of perspectives on a 
variety of extra-legal uses of future cognitive neuroscience evidence.  
These included two different discussions of the investigatory 
implications of neuroimaged deception detection from Professor 
Christian Halliburton and Dr. Dov Fox and Professor Stacey Tovino’s 
exploration of the impact of new neuroscience evidence on health 
insurance coverage for a variety of gender-specific health conditions.   
Professor Jonathan Marks focused our attention on the 
counterterrorism applications of cognitive neuroscience.  According to 
Professor Marks, who has obtained extensive discovery from the 
Department of Defense, the Department recently renewed its 
commitment to developing new deception detection technology when it 
renamed its “Polygraph Institute” the “Defense Academy for Credibility 
Assessment.”62  Professor Marks did not discuss MALINTENT, but 
presumably he is anticipating that the Defense Department will develop 
and promote a variety of new, sophisticated, well-funded deception 
detection technologies.  Professor Marks’ specific concerns about the 
extralegal implications of new “mind reading” technologies include: (1) 
the small number of test subjects that form the basis of existing studies, 
(2) the artificiality of  cognitive neuroscience testing environments, (3) 
the temporal limits of fMRI neuroimaging technology (which may fail to 
capture constant changes in brain activity), (4) variations in 
neuroanatomy, (5) the fact that deception is a complex situation-
dependant thought process, and (6) variations in response to test 
questions based on cultural expectations and subjective perceptions.  
Many of these same concerns should be shared by those who anticipate 
the potential in-court applications of cognitive neuroscience evidence. 
 
 62. See Department of Defense Directive Number 5210.48 (Jan. 25, 2007) at §1.5 (renaming 
the Department of Defense’s Polygraph Institute the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment), 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/521048p.pdf.  
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II.  HOW SHOULD LAW (AND LAW PROFESSORS) RESPOND TO 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE? 
In the airport on the way home from Akron, I commented to a 
fellow symposium participant that our discussions, which were streamed 
live on the internet and would soon be embodied in a series of articles, 
could alter the perceived validity of cognitive neuroscience evidence 
within the practicing legal community.  My specific concern is that 
intellectually stimulating explorations of the potential legal value and 
future impact of neuroimages that appear to correlate brain activity with 
cognition, deception, or social behavior might themselves alter the 
playing field by conferring a premature aura of legitimacy to this type of 
evidence.  This risk is enhanced by the fact that judges and lawyers who 
learn about this conference (and other cognitive neuroscience and law 
discussions) start with a common belief that the field relies demonstrably 
valid imaging technologies.  Finally, these concerns are also heightened 
by the fact that during this symposium (and the AALS Mid-Year 
Conference on Evidence in June 2008) cognitive neuroscience 
researchers spoke optimistically about the validity of their work; 
although this may be partially attributable to their vested financial 
interest in the future profitability of businesses that engage in  fMRI-
enhanced lie detection.63   
In other words, when law professors play in the field of science, 
should we be bound by the home team rules?  It is certainly interesting 
and fun to imagine how accurate brain scans revealing deception might 
change police interrogations, but if we ignore or underemphasize 
genuine validity problems or marginalize neurorealists and other critics 
from within the field, are we inadvertently encouraging courts and 
practitioners to follow our example?  This law professor’s answer was 
simple – academics have no responsibility and should have limited  
interest in what judges and lawyers do.  I appreciated his candor, but my 
plane was about to depart so I had little time to consider his position or 
respond.  With the benefit of time to reflect and a growing sense that his 
view is not unique, I have saved the final section of this Article for a 
brief response. 
 
 63. During three months in mid-2008, I attended two different legal academic conferences 
that included presentations on the validity of fMRI-enhanced lie detection from Steven J. Laken, 
President and CEO of Cephos Corp., which offers a for-profit lie detection service.  See supra note 
30 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Understanding the Value and Limits of Cognitive Neuroscience 
It is easy for law professors to recognize that science shapes law, 
but harder sometimes to see how law shapes science (or at least shapes 
our understanding of scientific developments and controversies).  So, at 
the risk of apostasy, I will suggest that academic prognosticators should 
bear some responsibility for weighing the obvious (and perhaps the less 
obvious) social costs of assuming, even for the sake of argument, the 
existence of accurate neuroimages of cognition, deception, or social 
behavior.  This should not be misunderstood as a preference for silence 
or a desire to chill interdisciplinary debate.  Instead, I offer two modest 
guiding principles for future conversations. 
First, as we wade into this new field we should be careful not to 
omit or obscure the fact that our theoretically interesting explorations of 
the philosophical, bioethical, or constitutional ramifications of cognitive 
neuroscience evidence are misleading in the short term and useless in the 
long term if the field fails to establish through unbiased, independent, 
and reliable research that neuroimaging accurately reveals not just the 
blood flow in a subject’s brain, but the content of her mind.64  Second, 
we should more thoroughly address the potentially problematic 
consequences of imminent legal and extralegal reliance on cognitive 
neuroscience evidence that is prematurely or inaccurately presumed by 
courts (or perhaps the Department of Defense) to be valid, but actually 
falls short of any reasonable threshold validity standards.   
Academics who acknowledge these risks and shortcomings can find 
good company among the neurorealists.  But the greatest obstacle to 
circumspection is not my ivory-tower ensconced colleague.  Instead, it is 
our shared human curiosity about the inner workings of the mind 
combined with our apparently insatiable desire to distill complex 
psychological phenomena into simple explanations that can be easily 
illustrated with brightly colored pictures.   
B.  Brain Research is Sexy   
Cognitive neuroscience research (even research of dubious validity) 
has the potential to shape legal and extralegal decisions because it is 
profoundly interesting and appealing.  For example, the “liar, liar, brain 
 
 64. I do not mean to suggest that these concerns are entirely ignored.  For example, Professor 
Greely’s keynote address (and his post-symposium blog report) included a discussion of “the need 
to balance talking about the possible implications of speculative technologies with asking always 
whether these technologies work or are likely to work.”  Hank Greely, University of Akron Law and 
Neuroscience Conference, (Oct. 20, 2008) http://lawandbiosciences.wordpress.com/2008 
/10/20/university-of-akron-law-and-neuroscience-conference/. 
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on fire” possibility was first explored by symposium panelist and 
Professor of Psychiatry Daniel Langleben of the University of 
Pennsylvania Medical School.  Starting in the late 1990s, Professor 
Langleben began to use fMRI technology to explore the neural correlates 
of deception.  Over the past two decades, neuroresearchers around the 
world have embarked on similar deception detection studies.65    
Other cognitive neuroscience research projects with obvious legal 
and social implications (not discussed at the symposium) should include 
the recent work of Professor Elizabeth Phelps of New York University.  
Professor Phelps has used fMRI scans to assess unconscious racism by 
measuring how long it takes test subjects to associate positive adjectives 
with black and white faces and comparing this to measurements of 
subjects’ amygdala blood flow activity.66  A third example (also not 
discussed at the symposium), is new research from Columbia University 
Medical Center on the potential impact of repeated exposure to violent 
images.  These researchers found  that fMRI scans of subjects repeatedly 
exposed to images of violence revealed diminished activity in the right 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex (the brain area purportedly associated with 
control over reactive aggressive behavior).67  As you can imagine, these 
studies are just the tip of the cognitive neuroscience iceberg. 
C.  Brain Research is Persuasive 
The risk of premature reliance on cognitive neuroscience research 
is also enhanced by recent studies demonstrating that research 
conclusions that appear to be supported by neuroscience data and/or 
brain scans are far more likely to be accepted and believed even when 
they are otherwise illogical. 
1.  Brain Scan Images Enhance Perceived Validity 
Neuropsychologists from the University of Colorado recently 
studied the impact of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning.  
This study exposed 156 undergraduate participants to fictional news 
 
 65. A Medline search run on October 1, 2008 revealed twenty-two research papers describing 
studies of neuroimaged lie detection.  The first two studies were published by Dr. Langleben 
(Department of Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania Medical School) and Dr. Lee (Department 
of Psychology, University of Hong Kong) in March 2002. 
 66. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007. 
 67. Christopher R. Kelly, et al., Repeated Exposure to Media Violence is Associated with 
Diminished Response in an Inhibitory Frontolimbic Network, PLOS ONE, (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0001268. 
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articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research.68  Each article 
was presented either without images, with an accompanying bar graph, 
or with accompanying brain scan images.69  The objective was to 
determine whether the bar graph and/or brain scan images enhanced the 
persuasive appeal of the research conclusions. 
Researchers discovered  that whenever neuroscience articles were 
accompanied by brain scan images (but not when they were 
accompanied by bar graphs), the perceived scientific merit of the article 
was significantly increased.70  This change occurred even when the text 
of the article was riddled with scientific reasoning errors.71  These 
findings led the researchers to conclude that “[b]rain images may be 
more persuasive than other representations of brain activity because they 
provide a tangible physical explanation for cognitive processes that is 
easily interpreted as such.”72   
2.  Cognitive Neuroscience Explanations (Even Without Brain 
Scan Images) Enhance Perceived Validity 
A 2008 study published in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 
explored the recent and intense public interest in neuroscience 
explanations of human behavior.73  To better understand why 
neuroscience is so intriguing to the general public, Yale University 
neuropsychologists hypothesized that people might “uncritically accept 
any explanation containing neuroscience information, even in cases 
when the neuroscience information is irrelevant to the logic of the 
explanation.”74  In this study, participants were asked to rate the quality 
of good and bad explanations of scientific phenomena.  Neuroscience 
information such as “brain scans indicate” and descriptions of “frontal 
lobe brain circuitry” were inserted into both good and bad 
explanations.75   
Researchers found that when the neuroscience references were 
omitted, subjects who ranged from novices, to students (members of an 
introduction to cognitive neuroscience class), to experts (individuals 
who were pursuing or had completed advanced cognitive neuroscience 
degrees) could readily distinguish between the good and bad scientific 
 
 68. McCabe & Castel, supra note 20, at 345. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 346. 
 71. Id. at 345-46. 
 72. Id. at 349. 
 73. See Weisberg, supra note 20. 
 74. Weisberg, supra note 20, at 470. 
 75. Id. at 471. 
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explanations.76  However, for novices and students, the introduction of 
(even irrelevant) references to brain scans and frontal lobe brain circuitry 
caused participants to overestimate the quality of the bad explanations.77  
Based on this data, the researchers concluded that “the neuroscience 
information provided them with a physical explanation for a behavioral 
phenomenon . . . [which] made the bad behavioral explanations seem 
connected to a larger explanatory system, and hence more insightful.”78 
These recent University of Colorado and Yale University studies 
suggest that cognitive neuroscience evidence and brain scan images are 
incredibly appealing, even to sophisticated audiences.  These findings 
have significant implications for our anticipated reliance on cognitive 
science research in legal and extralegal contexts.  In fact, the Yale study 
contains a very explicit warning – cognitive neuroscience evidence 
“presented in a courtroom, a classroom, or a political debate, regardless 
of the scientific status or relevance of the evidence, could strongly sway 
opinion, beyond what the evidence can support.”79  
III.  CONCLUSION 
The question is not whether cognitive neuroscience will change 
law, but whether cognitive neuroscience should change law now (or in 
the reasonably foreseeable future).  More knowledge about how the 
brain works and better images of brain activity have obvious social 
value.  However, as the debates within the field reveal, deciding when 
law can derive genuinely valid and useful information from 
neuroscience research on cognition/deception will be neither easy nor 
obvious.  Perhaps Arthur Clarke was right that ultimately “any 
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”80  
One day cognitive neuroscientists might perform the magic of accurate 
mind reading.  In the interim, law professors, judges, and lawyers should 
continue to work with neuroscientists (including neurorealists) to 
understand the value and the limits of their research.   
 
 76. Id. at 475. 
 77. Id. at 472-73, 475. 
 78. Id. at 476. 
 79. Id. at 477. 
 80. Arthur C. Clarke, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE 36 (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston 1962). 
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